ENHANCED ENCAPSULATED SECURITY PAYLOAD A NEW MECHANISM TO SECURE INTERNET PROTOCOL VERSION 6 OVER INTERNET PROTOCOL VERSION 4 by Rosilah Hassan et al.
Journal of Computer Science 10 (7): 1344-1354, 2014 
ISSN: 1549-3636   
© 2014 Science Publications 
doi:10.3844/jcssp.2014.1344.1354 Published Online 10 (7) 2014 (http://www.thescipub.com/jcs.toc) 
Corresponding Author: Rosilah  Hassan,  Research  Center  for  Software  Technology  and  Management,  Network  and 
Communication Technology Lab, Faculty of Information Science and Technology, Universiti Kebangsaan 
Malaysia, 43600 UKM Bangi, Selangor, Malaysia 
 
1344  Science Publications
 
JCS 
ENHANCED ENCAPSULATED SECURITY PAYLOAD A 
NEW MECHANISM TO SECURE INTERNET PROTOCOL 
VERSION 6 OVER INTERNET PROTOCOL VERSION 4 
Rosilah Hassan, Amjed Sid Ahmed, Nur Effendy Othman and Samer Sami 
 
Research Center for Software Technology and Management, 
Network and Communication Technology Lab, Faculty of Information Science and Technology, 
Universiti Kebangsaan Malaysia, 43600 UKM Bangi, Selangor, Malaysia 
 
Received 2013-11-24; Received 2013-11-27; Accepted 2014-03-04 
ABSTRACT 
A considerable amount of time will be needed before each system in the Internet can convert from 
Internet Protocol version 4 (IPv4) to Internet Protocol version 6 (IPv6). Three strategies have been 
proposed by the Internet Engineer Task Force (IETF) to help the transition from IPv4 to IPv6 which 
are dual stack, header translation and tunneling. Tunneling is used when two computers using IPv6 
want to communicate with each other and the packet will travel through a region that uses IPv4. To 
pass through this region, IPv6 packet must be encapsulated in IPv4 packet to have an IPv4 address in 
order to make it IPv4 routing compatible. Internet Protocol security (IPsec) in transport mode carries 
the payload of the encapsulating packet as a plain data without any mean of protection. That is, two 
nodes using IPsec in transport mode to secure the tunnel can spoof the inner payload; the packet will 
be de-capsulated successfully and accepted. IETF mentioned this problem in many RFCs. According to 
RFC 3964 there is no simple way to prevent spoofing attack in IPv6 over IPv4 tunnel and longer term 
solutions would have to be deployed in both IPv4 and IPv6 networks to help identify the source of the 
attack, a total prevention is likely impossible. This study proposed a new spoofing defense mechanism 
based on IPsec’s protocol Encapsulated Security Payload (ESP). ESP’s padding area had been used to 
write  the  IPv6  source  address  of  the  encapsulated  packet.  Simulation  is  conducted  based  on  two 
scenarios, one with spoofing attack and one without. The outcome proved that proposed mechanism 
has managed to eliminate spoofing threat in IPv6 over IPv4 tunnel.  
 
Keywords: IPv6, IPsec, ESP  
1. INTRODUCTION 
Until a full deployment of IPv6 done, IPv4 and IPv6 
will  co-exist  and  interacts  together  under  many 
circumstances  (Bouras  et  al.,  2003).  IPv6  over  IPv4 
Tunnel is applied when IPv6 hosts inside native IPv4 
network  need  to  communicate  with  native  IPv6 
network, but there is no direct IPv6 link between them. 
Tunneling  IPv6-in-IPv4  has  become  common  at  the 
early stage of IPv6 deployment. The general idea is to 
make the IPv6 packet as the payload of IPv4 packet, 
i.e., IPv6 packets are encapsulated in IPv4 packets and 
then  are  transmitted over IPv4 networks like ordinary 
IPv4 packets (Raicu and Zeadally, 2003).  
Since  commonly  that  IPv6  hosts/networks  are 
separated by IPv4 network, IPv6 over IPv4 Tunnel is very 
important for IPv6 transition. In IPv6 over IPv4 tunnel, 
when  a  tunnel  end  point  receives  an  encapsulated  data 
packet, it de-capsulate the packet and sends it to the other 
local  forwarding  scheme.  Because  IPv6-in-IPv4  tunnels 
do not use any form of authentication, a tunnel destination 
will accept an encapsulated packet sent by any node as Rosilah Hassan et al. / Journal of Computer Science 10 (7): 1344-1354, 2014 
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long as the source IPv4 address of the packet is the IPv4 
address of the tunnel source (Colitti et al., 2004). 
The security threats in IPv6 over IPv4 tunnel are 
caused by the spoofed encapsulated packet sent by the 
attackers in IPv4 networks. The target of attacks can 
be either a normal IPv6 node or the tunnel end point 
(Bi et al., 2007). When IPv6 packet is encapsulated in 
IPv4 payload then there is no means for administrators 
to know about IPv6 traffic that has tunneled into their 
networks  (Sabnis  and  Tech,  2013).  Unfortunately 
tunneling introduces security threats in which intruders 
may  spoof  the  address  of  the  packet  origin  and 
potentially  inject  the  packet  at  the  tunnel  endpoint 
(Taib and Budiarto, 2010). Spoofing in IPv6 over IPv4 
tunnel still represents a serious problem today, one of the 
solutions that been proposed is to use IPsec with ingress 
filtering.  In  order  to  do  ingress  filtering,  the  network 
needs to know which IP addresses each of the networks 
it is connected to may send. This is not always possible. 
For instance, a network that has a single connection to 
the Internet has no way to know if a packet coming from 
that connection is spoofed or not. 
2. BACKGROUND 
2.1. Spoofing  
A crucial element enabling numerous different types of 
Internet Protocol (IP) attacks is the ability for an adversary 
to modify their source IP address and the ports they are 
communicating  on  to  appear  as  though  traffic  initiated 
from  another  location  or  another  application.  This  so-
called “spoofing” attack is prevalent despite the presence 
of best practices to mitigate the usefulness of the attack 
(Sharma, 2010). IP spoofing is one of the major network 
spoofing techniques. It consists of SYN flooding, Transfer 
Control Protocol (TCP) hijacking and Address Resolution 
Protocol (ARP) spoofing (Wang, 2009). IP spoofing is a 
technique used to gain unauthorized access to computers 
by which the attacker acts as a trusted computer either by 
using  an  internal  IP  address  within  the  range  of  the 
network or alternatively by using an authorized external IP 
address. The first step that attacker must do is to determine 
a valid IP address of a trusted host and then modify the 
packet header to make it appear that it come from that 
trusted host (Bidgoli, 2009). Spoofing could be executed 
at DNS, Web and email level (Kamal and Issac, 2007). 
2.2. IPv4 Verses IPv6  
IPv4  is  the  delivery  mechanism  which  used  by 
TCP/IP protocols to deliver a packet from some source 
to another destination. Figure 1 shows the location of 
IPv4 in the TCP/IP suite. IPv4 is a connectionless and a 
non-reliable  datagram  protocol  which  did  not  provide 
any means for error control or flow control (except for 
the header’s error detection). Because IPv4 assumes the 
unreliability of the underlying layers it does it best-
effort to get a transmission through to its destination, 
but with no guarantees. If reliability is important, IPv4 
must be paired with a reliable protocol such as TCP. 
The  best-effort  delivery  service  could  be  explained 
clearly  through  the  post  office  example.  The  post 
office does its best to deliver the mail but sometimes 
it fail to deliver a particular letter. If an unregistered 
letter is lost, it is up to the sender or would-be receipt 
to discover the loss and rectify the problem. The post 
office  itself  does  not  keep  track  of  every  letter  and 
cannot notify a sender of loss or damage. IPv4 is also 
a  connection  less  protocol  for  a  packet-switching 
network that uses the datagram approach. This means 
that each datagram is handled independently and each 
datagram  travel  through  a  different  route  to  the 
destination.  This  implies  that  datagram  sent  by  the 
same source to the same destination could arrive out 
of order. Also, some could be lost or corrupted during 
transmission.  Again,  IPv4  relies  on  a  higher-level 
protocol to take care of all these problems. Because 
IPv4 has some deficiencies, listed below, that makes it 
unsuitable for fast-growing internet: 
 
·  Address limitations  
·  Lack of resources reservation and minimum delay 
strategies  
·  No encryption or authentication is provided by IPv4 
 
IPv6  also  known  as  Internetworking  Protocol  next 
generation  (IPng)  was  proposed  to  solve  these 
deficiencies.  IPv6  is  an  evolution  of  IPv4  and  it  was 
designed  as  an  upgrade  version  of  IPv4.  In  IPv6,  the 
Internet protocol was extensively modified to handle the 
sudden growth of the Internet. The format and the length 
of the IP address  were changed along  with the packet 
format.  Related  protocols,  such  as  Internet  Control 
Message  Protocol  (ICMP),  were  also  modified.  Other 
protocols  in  the  network  layer,  such  as  ARP,  Reverse 
Address Resolution Protocol (RARP) and Internet Group 
Management  Protocol  (IGMP),  were  either  deleted  or 
included  in  the  ICMPv6  protocol.  Routing  protocols, 
such as  Routing Information Protocol (RIP) and Open 
Shortest Path First (OSPF), were also slightly modified 
to accommodate these changes.  Rosilah Hassan et al. / Journal of Computer Science 10 (7): 1344-1354, 2014 
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Fig. 1. Transfer control protocol/internet protocol. 
 
Communications  experts  predicted  that  IPv6  along 
with its related protocols will soon replace the current IP 
version.  The  adaption  of  IPv6  has  been  slow.  This  is 
because the original motivation behind its development, 
limitation of IPv4 address, has been remedied by short-
term  strategies  such  as  classless  addressing  and  NAT. 
But sooner or later the fast-spreading use of the Internet 
and new services such as cloud computing (Tsai and Lin, 
2011),  mobile  IP  (Hassan  and  Hassan,  2011),  IP 
telephony and IP-capable mobile telephony, will require 
the  total  replacement  of  IPv4  with  IPv6.  The  next 
generation, or IPv6, has some advantages over IPv4 that 
can be summarized as follow:  
 
·  Better header format  
·  New options that allow additional functionalities  
·  Allowance for extension  
·  Support for resource allocation  
·  Support for more security  
 
Still the main difference between IPv4 and IPv6 is in 
their  addressing  formats  and  inclusion  of  IPsec 
(Murugesan et al., 2009). IPv4 uses 32-bit (4-bytes) ad-
dresses  to  uniquely  identify  nodes  within  the  global 
Inter-net.  IPv6  uses  128-bit  (16-bytes)  addresses  to 
uniquely identify nodes within the global Internet. With 
IPv6 large address space, it is clearly can resolve address 
depletion problem in IPv4 (Sailan et al., 2009), but still 
behave  ap-proximately  the  same  throughput  as  IPv4 
(Ismail and Abidin, 2009).  
2.3. IP Spoofing Defense Methods  
Spoofing defense’s solutions originally can be broken 
down into three categories (Ehrenkranz and Li, 2009).  
2.3.1. End-Host-Based Solutions  
These types of solutions are implemented on the end-
hosts; the aim of these solutions is to allow the end-hosts 
to detect the spoofed packets. These kinds of solutions 
do not require any change in the network infrastructure 
and  they  are  the  easiest  in  deployment,  but  they  are 
acting too late because the spoofed packets will arrived 
to the end-host before they are recognized. 
2.3.2. Router-Based Solutions  
These types of solutions are applied by routers, either at 
the core and edge of the Internet or at each side separately. 
These  solutions  in  general  face  more  difficulties  to 
implemented, but they are the most effective because they 
stop spoofed packets from even reach end-hosts. Routers 
may  apply  some  reactive  mechanisms  like  tracing  from 
where a malicious packet is arrived. However, routers may 
not be perfect for the scalable attacks (Saini et al., 2011). 
2.3.3. Solutions Requiring the Use of Both Routers 
and End-Hosts  
In order for these solutions to work routers and end-
hosts  must  work  together.  A  clear  difference  between 
host-based and router-based mechanisms refers to the end-
to-end argument. Host based mechanisms obviously relate 
to  end-to-end  principles  while  router-based  mechanisms Rosilah Hassan et al. / Journal of Computer Science 10 (7): 1344-1354, 2014 
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do  not.  This  makes  the  deployment  of  host-based 
mechanisms to be much easier than router-base solutions. 
Host based solutions in general can be deployed even on a 
single host, without the need of any other host or router. 
Table 1 overviews different spoofing defense mechanism. 
2.4. IP Security  
IPsec  is  mandated  in  the  IPv6  protocol.  Every 
implementation claiming support  for IPv6  is expected to 
provide IPsec as part of the protocol (Radwan, 2005). IPsec 
is originally developed by the Internet Engineer Task Force, 
IETF,  IPsec  Working  Group.  IPsec  was  developed  and 
design to provide several services such as access control, 
connectionless  integrity,  origin  authentication,  replay 
protection  and  confidentiality  (Dhall  et  al.,  2012).  IPsec 
provide these services by dividing its protocol suite into two 
traffic security protocols, the Authentication Header (AH) 
and the Encapsulation Security Payload (ESP) (Shue et al., 
2007). The AH protocol provides source authentication and 
data  integrity  but  no  confidentiality.  The  ESP  protocol 
provides  authentication,  data  integrity  and  confidentiality 
(Meenakshi and Raghavan, 2006). Both AH and ESP could 
be run in either transport mode or tunnel mode as we will 
explain later in this study (Kizza, 2005). In order for the 
IPsec  to  provide  security  it  must  first  get  as  much 
information as possible on the security arrangement of the 
two communicating hosts. This information about how the 
security will look like between two communicating hosts is 
called Security Association (SA). An IPsec SA defines the 
following information as a part of the security association:  
 
·  Destination IP addresses  
·  The security protocol that will be used  
·  Secret keys  
·  Encapsulation mode  
·  Security Parameter Index (SPI)  
 
IPsec keep the security association in a special data 
base called Security Association Database (SAD) and 
as sign an index for each of them, by using security 
association index (Black, 2000). IPsec operates in one 
of  two  different  modes:  The  transport  mode  or  the 
tunnel mode as shown in Fig. 2. 
In  the  transport  mode,  IPsec  protects  what  is 
delivered from the transport layer to the network layer. 
In other words, the transport mode protects the network 
layer  pay-load,  the  payload  to  be  encapsulated  in  the 
network  layer.  Note  that  the  transport  mode  does  not 
protect the IP header. In other words, the transport mode 
does not protect the whole IP packet; it protects only the 
packet from the transport layer (the IP layer payload). In 
this mode, the IPsec header and trailer are added to the 
information  coming  from  the  transport  layer.  The  IP 
header is added later. IPsec in the transport mode does 
not  protect  the  IP  header;  it  only  protects  the 
information coming from the transport layer.  
 
Table 1. Spoofing defense methods 
Host-based solutions     Router-based solutions 
----------------------------------------------------  -------------------------------------------------    
Active   Passive   basic   Distributed   Combination 
Cryptographic: IPsec 
Probing: OS fingerprint, IP ID    Martian address filtering,  Spoofing  Path Identifier (Pi), 
field probing, TCP probing    ingress/egress filtering,  Prevention Method  StackPi  
Other: SYN cookies, IP puzzles    reverse path forwarding  (SPM), Passport. 
 
 
 
Fig. 2. IP security modes Rosilah Hassan et al. / Journal of Computer Science 10 (7): 1344-1354, 2014 
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Fig. 3. E-ESP’s Packet 
 
The transport mode is normally used  when  we need 
host-to-host  (end-to-end)  protection  of  data.  The 
sending host uses IPsec to authenticate and/or encrypt 
the payload delivered from the transport layer.  
The  receiving  host  uses  IPsec  to  check  the 
authentication and/or decrypt the IP packet and deliver it 
to the transport layer. In the tunnel mode, IPsec protects 
the entire IP packet. It takes an IP packet, including the 
header,  applies  IPsec  security  methods  to  the  entire 
packet  and  then  adds  a  new  IP  header.  The  new  IP 
header  has  different  information  than  the  original  IP 
header. The tunnel mode is normally used between two 
routers, between a host and a router, or between a router 
and a host. In other words, we use the tunnel mode when 
either the sender or the receiver is not a host. The entire 
original packet is protected from intrusion between the 
sender and the receiver. It’s as if the whole packet goes 
through  an  imaginary  tunnel.  IPsec  in  tunnel  mode 
protects the original IP header. 
3. EXPERIMENTAL WORKS 
Simulation is conducted based on two scenarios. The 
first scenario represents the first case implementation of our 
proposed  defense  mechanism,  in  which  the  IPv6  source 
address of the encapsulated packet is left intact. The second 
scenario represents the second case implementation of our 
proposed  defense  mechanism,  in  which  we  execute 
spoofing attack to change the IPv6 source address of the 
encapsulated  packet.  Both  scenarios  are  run  based  on  a 
customized packet which we call it Enhanced Encapsulated 
Security Payload (E-ESP) packet as in Fig. 3. 
 
 
Fig. 4. E-ESP’s Algorithm 
 
3.1. Algorithm  
For both scenarios we have two variables V1 and V2 
which represents IPv6 source address of the encapsulated 
packet  and  IPv6  source  address  in  padding  area 
respectively. In addition we used a third variable called 
V3 to represent the spoofed IPv6 source address. Figure 
4  below  shows  the  algorithm  used  to  implement  the 
proposed defense mechanism. 
3.2. Process Flow Chart  
Following is the process flow chart of the proposed 
defense mechanism as per Fig. 5.  
3.3. Simulation Results  
The results of the first scenario shown that packets 
which  have  IPv6  source  address  of  the  encapsulated 
packet  match the IPv6 source address in padding area 
were successfully delivered as per Fig 6. On the other Rosilah Hassan et al. / Journal of Computer Science 10 (7): 1344-1354, 2014 
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hand,  the  results  of  the  second  scenario  shown  that 
packets  which  have  mismatch  between  IPv6  source 
address of encapsulated packet and IPv6 source address 
in  the  padding  area  were  dropped  as  per  Fig.  7. 
 
 
   
 
Fig. 5. Mechanism’s process flow chart Rosilah Hassan et al. / Journal of Computer Science 10 (7): 1344-1354, 2014 
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Fig. 6. First scenario’s results 
 
 
 
Fig. 7. Second scenario’s results Rosilah Hassan et al. / Journal of Computer Science 10 (7): 1344-1354, 2014 
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4. DISCUSSION 
IPsec suite could be run either in transport mode or 
tunnel  mode  to  secure  communication  between  two 
nodes.  In  case  of  transport  mode  IPsec  protects  the 
pay-load of the network layer, but did not protect the 
original  IP  header.  As  we  mentioned  earlier  in  this 
article, in order to send IPv6 packet (inner) through 
IPv4  region,  we  have  to  encapsulate  it  into  IPv4 
packet (outer). When using IPsec in transport mode to 
secure  IPv6  over  IPv4  tunnel  IPsec  carries  IPv6 
packet (which includes IPv6 source address) as plain 
data  with  no  mean  of  protection.  That  is  any  two 
nodes  share  the  tunnel  can  de-capsulate  the  pack-et 
easily  and  using  IPv6  source  address  to  execute 
spoofing  attack.  The  mechanism  proposed  in  this 
article  is  working  based  on  runs  IPsec’s  ESP  and 
using an empty space in ESP frame (padding area) to 
write  the  IPv6  source  address  of  the  inner  packet 
before encapsulate it into IPv4 packet to transmit it, 
ESP  adds  a  header  and  trailer.  Note  that  ESP’s 
authentication data are added at the end of the packet 
which  makes  its  calculation  easier.  Figure  8  shows 
the  location  of  ESP’s  header  and  trailer  and  Fig.  9 
shows the proposed area (padding).  
When  an  IP  datagram  carries  an  ESP  header  and 
trailer, the value of the protocol field in the IP header is 
50.  A  filed  inside  the  ESP  trailer  holds  the  original 
value of the protocol field. The ESP working procedure 
follows these steps:  
 
·  An ESP trailer is added to the payload  
·  The payload and the trailer are encrypted 
·  The ESP header is added 
·  The ESP header, payload and ESP trailer are used to 
create the authentication data 
·  The authentication data is added to the end of the 
ESP trailer  
·  The IP header is added after the protocol value is 
changed to 50 
 
Referring to the ESP’s procedure steps and Fig. 8, 
the  payload  and  the  trailer  are  encrypted  and  by 
referring  to  the  Fig.  9  and  see  the  location  of  the 
proposed  area  to  write  the  IPv6  source  address  on  it 
(padding area) we can sense the level of the security 
added to defend against IP spoofing in IPv6 over IPv4 
tunnel. We have the IPv6 source address written in the 
ESP’s  trailer  and  the  whole  trailer  is  encrypted.  The 
only one have the key to decrypt the ESP trailer is the 
node of the receiving end point of the tunnel. In the 
receiving end, the receiver will de-capsulate the IPv6 
frame  and  before  forward  the  packet  will  match  the 
IPv6 source address in the encapsulated packet with the 
one written to the padding area in IPsec’s ESP frame 
and  only  forward  the  packet  if  they  matched.  If  the 
receiver  detect  a  difference  between  IPv6  source 
address  of  the  encapsulated  packet  with  the  one  in 
ESP’s  padding  area  this  will  imply  that  an  intruder 
spoof  the  IPv6  source  address  of  the  encapsulated 
packet and accordingly will drop the packet. Although 
the proposed mechanism has solved the problem still 
it has limitation in a circumstance of networks which 
have  large  number  of  mobile  nodes.  In  such 
circumstance the padding area may be fully used for 
other  network  purposes.  We  involved  a  proposed 
solution  for  this  limitation  in  the  conclusion  and 
future  works section. Figure 10 represents a logical 
diagram of how E-ESP works. The proposed defense 
mechanism shown a good performance and eliminate 
the spoofing threat in IPv6 over IPv4 tunnel.  
 
 
 
Fig. 8. Encapsulated Security Payload (ESP) protocol in transport mode Rosilah Hassan et al. / Journal of Computer Science 10 (7): 1344-1354, 2014 
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Fig. 9. Encapsulated security payload frame 
 
 
 
Fig. 10. Logical diagram of E-ESP Rosilah Hassan et al. / Journal of Computer Science 10 (7): 1344-1354, 2014 
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5. CONCLUSION 
In this article we introduced a new spoofing defense 
mechanism  to  eliminate  spoofing  threat  that  happen 
when using IPsec in transport mode to secure IPv6 over 
IPv4 tunnel. The new mechanism work based on IPsec 
protocol ESP, it uses the padding area of ESP to write 
the  IPv6  source  address  of  the  packet  that  will  travel 
across  IPv4  region.  Simulation  is  done  based  on  two 
scenarios. The outcome of the collected results  shown 
that the proposed defense mechanism works with a good 
performance  rate.  Because  the  verification  and 
authentication are done per packet the proposed defense 
mechanism  can  detect  spoofed  packets  whatever  the 
number  of  hops  does  it  cross  in  the  IPv4  region.  We 
introduced  the  proposed  mechanism  in  (Ahmed  et  al., 
2012) as a theoretical concept. After which we go for 
algorithms  formulation  in  (Hassan  and  Ahmed,  2013) 
and finally shift to the implementation and experimental 
works to evaluate the results. There are many potential 
directions for future research that can be done based on 
this  article.  As  future  works  we  should  give  a  good 
concern  about  networks  which  have  large  number  of 
mobile nodes, under such circumstance the padding area 
sometimes  is  almost  fully  utilized.  A  study  about 
queuing mechanism to manage the padding area in case 
of  fully  used  should  be  carried  out.  Also  we  should 
consider  the  possibility  of  adding  new  field  in  the 
original ESP frame to carry the IPv6 source address of 
the  encapsulated  packet  instead  of  using  the  padding 
area. By restructuring the ESP frame padding area could 
be saved for other network usage purposes. A research 
about  enhancing  the  encryption  algorithm  that  used  to 
encrypt ESP payload and trailer should be carried out for 
better security and faster process.  
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